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In this paper we pursue three main objectives: (1) to develop a model of an intermediated search market inwhich matching between consumers and ﬁrms takes place primarily via paid referrals; (2) to address the
question of designing a suitable mechanism for selling referrals to ﬁrms; and (3) to characterize and analyze the
ﬁrms’ bidding strategies given consumers’ equilibrium search behavior. To achieve these objectives we develop
a two-stage model of search intermediaries in a vertically differentiated product market. In the ﬁrst stage an
intermediary chooses a search engine design that speciﬁes to which extent a ﬁrm’s search rank is determined
by its bid and to which extent it is determined by the product offering’s performance. In the second stage,
based on the search engine design, competing ﬁrms place their open bids to be paid for each referral by the
search engine. We ﬁnd that the revenue-maximizing search engine design bases rankings on a weighted average
of product performance and bid amount. Nonzero pure-strategy equilibria of the underlying discontinuous
bidding game generally exist but are not robust with respect to noisy clicks in the system. We determine a
unique nondegenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium that is robust to noisy clicks. In this equilibrium ﬁrms
of low product performance fully dissipate their rents, which are appropriated by the search intermediary and
the ﬁrm with the better product. The ﬁrms’ expected bid amounts are generally nonmonotonic in product
performance and depend on the search engine design parameter. The intermediary’s proﬁt-maximizing design
choice, by attributing a positive weight to the ﬁrms’ bids, tends to obfuscate search results and reduce overall
consumer surplus compared to the socially optimal design of fully transparent results ranked purely on product
performance.
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Truly, to tell lies is not honorable;
But when the truth entails tremendous ruin,
To speak dishonorably is pardonable.
Sophocles (495 b.c.–406 b.c.), Creusa
1. Introduction
Even in a time when electronic commerce and Internet
presence of many ﬁrms seem to increase trans-
parency in product markets, residual and—as we
argue—partially intended imperfections may lead to
signiﬁcant price dispersion, especially when goods
are differentiated along one or more dimensions
(Clemons et al. 2002, Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001,
Clay et al. 2001). The difﬁculties consumers have in
ﬁnding and comparing goods have led to the ﬂour-
ishing of search intermediaries. The intermediaries’
information aggregation capacity enables marketing
to a captive advertising audience (Bhargava and
Choudhary 2004). Direct beneﬁts from exercising con-
trol over the order in which search results appear
can be derived from the ﬁrms’ willingness to pay
for referrals to their websites. Thus, the ranking of
ﬁrms produced by a search engine as a response to
a consumer’s search request is likely to be inﬂuenced
by payments from the industry. Google, for exam-
ple, currently places “sponsor results” above “website
matches” for common generic search terms such as
“books.” This suggests that there exists a burgeon-
ing market for paid referrals (Edelman et al. 2007),
even in an environment that per se is characterized
by relatively low cost of information aggregation and
dissemination. Naturally, the result may be a partial
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“obfuscation” of information leading to decreased
transparency (Ellison and Ellison 2004). The search
intermediary itself may act as a proﬁt-maximizing
agent selling, or more precisely auctioning off, the
order in which information is made accessible.1 The
rationale is that consumers with a high opportunity
cost of time will tend to limit their search in the form
of comparison shopping to the ﬁrst few hits from a
“trusted” search intermediary.2
In this paper we pursue three main objectives: (1) to
develop a model of an intermediated search mar-
ket in which matching between consumers and ﬁrms
takes place primarily via paid referrals; (2) to address
the important managerial question (for a search inter-
mediary) of ﬁnding a suitable mechanism for selling
referrals to ﬁrms; and (3) to characterize the ﬁrms’
equilibrium bidding strategies as well as consumers’
equilibrium search behavior.
In our model we assume that there are two rival
ﬁrms offering products of possibly many different
attributes in the same market. Consumers, who are
initially uninformed, can either directly inspect the
different products at local retailers or—often at a
smaller cost—follow referrals (or links) provided by a
search intermediary. In order to maximize their rev-
enues in this search market, ﬁrms therefore have an
incentive to compete actively for referrals which are
followed by a larger number of consumers. In con-
testing the higher-ranking referrals ﬁrms thus engage
in rent seeking (Tullock 1980), i.e., behavior destined
to appropriate potential excess returns in the market.
As a consequence, the value of top referrals has to be
equal to the extra rents that ﬁrms can obtain by being
referred to more consumers. We ﬁnd that in a mar-
ket with ﬁrms of different product performances it is,
perhaps surprisingly, the low-performance ﬁrms that
tend to expend most of their expected surplus from
1 There is an oligopolistic market of differentiated search engines
(Bradlow and Schmittlein 2000, Gandal 2001), a fact that we bypass
in our considerations of a world with a single (monopolistic) search
intermediary.
2 There is some evidence that explicit comparison shopping
(beyond the inspection of a search intermediary’s ranking) on the
Internet is relatively limited (less than 1.5 clicks on average accord-
ing to Johnson et al. 2004). This effect has been shown to persist
in controlled experiments: even when search cost is relatively low,
subjects tend not to search enough (Zwick et al. 2003).
being ranked high; in other words, they are likely
to squander their expected supranormal rents com-
pletely in their quest for advantage (in accordance
with Posner’s 1975 “rent dissipation postulate”). Con-
trary to what is common practice at leading search
intermediaries such as Yahoo! and Nextag, we ﬁnd
that for the sale of paid referrals it is generally not
optimal to base the ranking of ﬁrms purely on bid
amounts.3 Taking the consumers’ search behavior into
account, it is often beneﬁcial to rank a ﬁrm accord-
ing to a weighted average of its product performance
(e.g., reputation as evaluated by consumer feedback
or based on other metrics, cf. Footnote 3) and its bid,
which can increase the intermediary’s revenue notice-
ably. There is another important interpretation of our
results. Given the difﬁculty, or near impossibility, of
an intermediary being able to commit to a mechanism
that is not transparent, in the sense that the pro-
duced allocations are not veriﬁable by the participat-
ing agents (e.g., the mechanism employed by Google
for ranking sponsored search results), our results shed
light on the equilibrium information disclosure that
can be expected in such situations.
In our auction setting (further detailed below) it
turns out that, quite independent of the weight placed
by the intermediary’s ranking mechanism on product
performance versus bid amount, the underlying open
bidding game for search terms implies discontinuous
best-response functions for each vertically differenti-
ated ﬁrm and is without pure-strategy Nash equilib-
ria that are robust with respect to even the smallest
amount of “noisy clicks” in the system. Exceptions
are those special cases of large interﬁrm performance
differences that may provoke zero-bid “shutdown”
solutions where no ﬁrm bids a positive amount. More
speciﬁcally, we show that there exists an equilibrium
of the bidding game consisting of either nonrobust
pure strategies or mixed bidding strategies with pos-
itive expected bid amounts by both parties. Clearly
3 Since May 2007, in part due to this research (personal com-
munication), Yahoo! Search Marketing also considers quality in
its ranking formula (“[y]our bid and ad quality affect your
ad rank in search results (...) Ad quality is determined by an
ad’s expected performance (based on various relevance factors
considered by Yahoo!’s ranking algorithms) and historical per-
formance (click-through rate relative to the ad’s position on
the page).” [http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/srch/pricing.php;
June 25, 2007]).
Weber and Zheng: A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals
416 Information Systems Research 18(4), pp. 414–436, © 2007 INFORMS
it is in the intermediary’s best interest to avoid zero-
bid equilibria, which implies a degree of obfuscation
in the search results, i.e., the weight the intermedi-
ary can place on ﬁrm performance without induc-
ing a zero-bid equilibrium is bounded from above. In
Appendix B we discuss some empirical support for
the results of our model, in particular for ﬁrms using
mixed bidding strategies.
1.1. Literature Review
As a consequence of imperfections in product mar-
kets, in particular consumer search costs, matching
between buyers and sellers is often difﬁcult. Adver-
tising and more recently intermediation can reduce
buyers’ search costs and thus facilitate the match-
ing process. Indeed, advertising in a search market
has been recognized by Stigler (1961) as “the obvi-
ous modern method to identify buyers and sellers”
(p. 216). He continues to point out that “[t]he iden-
tiﬁcation of buyers and sellers reduces drastically
the cost of search” (ibid.), which has given rise to
a rich literature on how much ﬁrms should spend
on advertising (Butters 1977, Stegeman 1991) and
how informative advertising should be (Shapiro 1982,
Grossman and Shapiro 1984). Stiglitz (1989) provides
an excellent overview of the classical literature on
search in product markets with imperfect informa-
tion. One important characteristic of search markets
is that, due to consumer heterogeneities, it is natu-
ral for price dispersion to arise in equilibrium (Pratt
et al. 1979, Varian 1980, Rob 1985, Stahl 1989). Such
price dispersion has been empirically found to be per-
sistent, even in markets with relatively low search
costs, such as online books (Clay et al. 2001), online
travel (Clemons et al. 2002), or Internet car retailing
(Morton et al. 2001). The presence of search interme-
diaries such as shopbots has not been found to alter
signiﬁcantly consumers’ reliance on brand to make
purchase decisions and thus to effectively reduce their
search costs (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001).
The potential role of intermediaries as welfare-
improving agents in markets with asymmetrically
distributed information is clear since Akerlof (1970)
showed that gains from trade may not be realized
as a result of an excess in private product informa-
tion on the part of the seller. Biglaiser (1993) demon-
strates that middlemen can be welfare-improving in
a relatively general bargaining model with adverse
selection. Chen et al. (2002) examine the role of such
middlemen as an instrument for price discrimination
between ofﬂine and online product offerings (the lat-
ter, as they ﬁnd, typically at a lower price), and thus
indirectly conﬁrm the welfare-improving role that
intermediaries can play in facilitating bi- or multilat-
eral trade. Most of the extant literature on interme-
diaries has not particularly stressed the consequences
of their self-interested behavior as proﬁt-maximizing
agents, which can be expected to counterbalance
some of the welfare created for the trading parties.
A notable exception is Lizzeri (1999), who examines
a situation where one seller uses an intermediary to
communicate private information to two buyers by an
endogenous “certiﬁcation” procedure. He ﬁnds that
it is revenue maximizing for the intermediary to dis-
close the achievement of minimum quality standards
to the buyers. Generally, including the intermediary’s
interests into the analysis implies that monetary trans-
fers between trading partners and intermediary are
per se welfare neutral. Instead of being interpreted as
a sink for ﬁrms engaging in rent-seeking behavior dis-
sipating their monopoly (or oligopoly) rents (Baumol
et al. 1982), the intermediary appropriates and at least
partially conserves these rents. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1987) stress that a careful use of game theory can
reverse some of the consequences of Posner’s (1975)
“dissipation” and “wastefulness” postulates, which
predict that monopoly rents are completely wasted by
ﬁrms trying to attain and conserve monopoly power.
In this paper, we focus on a search intermediary
that collects payments from ﬁrms in return for con-
sumer referrals. In our setting the intermediary, by
reducing consumer search costs, enables trade by
matching supply and demand for a heterogeneous
good. Bhargava and Feng (2004), similar to Baye and
Morgan (2001), examine a situation in which such a
proﬁt-maximizing search intermediary derives rents
from displaying ﬁrms’ paid advertisements instead
of an unbiased set of search results that users value.
The intermediary then needs to trade off an increase
in revenues from ﬁxed-fee paid placements against
a loss of user-based subscription revenues due to a
bias in the search results. Our setting is quite dif-
ferent in that we focus on paid referrals, the priority
of which is auctioned off by a search intermediary to
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competing ﬁrms. In this auction, ﬁrms bid an amount
to be paid for each referral (in the form of a “click-
through”) generated by the search intermediary. The
auction is “all-pay” in the sense that the bid amounts
need to be paid for any referrals, independent of the
achieved search rank. All-pay auctions arise some-
times in nonmarket situations where decisions about
effort or investment are made before the winner of
a contest is announced, such as in lobbying activi-
ties (Baye et al. 1993). The intermediary can base the
ranking of the ﬁrms partly on their bids and partly
on product quality (and/or ﬁrm reputation). Multi-
component scoring rules which incorporate other
dimensions of an agreement in addition to mone-
tary bids are sometimes used in procurement auctions
and unit price contracts (Ewerhart and Fieseler 2003).
Anticipating the ﬁrms’ equilibrium bidding behavior,
the intermediary determines a revenue-maximizing
search engine design in the form of an optimal weight
in the ranking function (cf. also Liu and Chen 2006).
If the ﬁrms have an incentive to bid positive amounts
for being ranked ﬁrst, we show that the bidding equi-
librium is generally in mixed strategies, which makes
it difﬁcult for consumers to take the open bids as sig-
nals for the ﬁrms’ respective product performance.
In our setting it is the low type that fully dissipates
expected proﬁts on bidding for referrals, until a bal-
ance is reached between the expected conversion rate
and payments for (possibly unsuccessful) referrals,
in contrast to the standard signaling models.4 Our
paper is the ﬁrst to address strategic interdependen-
cies between bidders, which arise naturally in the con-
text of paid referrals as ﬁrms are trying to sell their
products to the same heterogeneous consumer base.
1.2. Outline
In §2 we develop our basic analytical model and
describe the main underlying assumptions. In §3 we
derive the ﬁrms’ equilibrium bidding strategies and
the consumers’ equilibrium search behavior, given a
certain search engine design. We show that for any
search engine design that yields nonzero intermediary
revenues, there is a unique Nash bidding equilibrium
4 In Spence’s (1973) classical signaling results, given a separating
equilibrium it is the low type that does not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to send
the costly signal, whereas the high type does and thus engages in
rent-seeking behavior.
in mixed strategies, for which we determine the ﬁrms’
expected second-period proﬁt. In §4 we derive the
intermediary’s optimal search engine design, that—in
contrast to a welfare-maximizing design—will always
put a positive weight on the ﬁrms’ bids to avoid
a zero-bid equilibrium. We also compute the opti-
mal design explicitly for a concrete example. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper with directions for further
research.
2. The Model
Consider two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, that offer differentiated
substitute goods in a common market. These goods
may have a number of different attributes including
price and quality. The exact nature of these attributes
matters for our model only insofar as each bun-
dle of attributes can be expected to generate a cer-
tain utility u for a given consumer (Lancaster 1966).
Ex ante, when selecting these attributes, both ﬁrms
are confronted with uncertainty about the market and
about the other ﬁrm’s technological possibilities. In
this regard both ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves in an iden-
tical decision situation. We assume that at a certain
pre-play stage (which remains unmodelled here) there
exists an equilibrium (e.g., a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium) in which ﬁrms choose product offerings, the
resulting performance of which will need to be evalu-
ated by consumers and is thus subject to a signiﬁcant
uncertainty from the ﬁrms’ point of view. Consumers,
on the other hand, are unable to simulate the ﬁrms’
decision processes and form beliefs about the net
utility (surplus) of a product offering obtained from
one of the ﬁrms at random. This utility is realized
when purchasing the product (i.e., accepting the prod-
uct offering with all its attributes including price), so
that consumers inspecting both ﬁrms’ product offer-
ings can be rationally expected to select the utility-
maximizing one. It is the consumers’ beliefs about the
net utilities that we take as primitives of our model.5
5 Explicitly incorporating the ﬁrms’ strategic behavior in choosing
product attributes, such as price and/or quality, leads to a signiﬁ-
cantly more complex model formulation, which proves analytically
intractable. The main difﬁculty lies in the fact that for the ﬁrms’
attribute choice to remain “interior” (e.g., price to remain ﬁnite),
it must be the case that consumers are able to simulate the ﬁrms’
decisions and adjust their expectations accordingly (e.g., high price
eventually leads to zero demand or equivalently no search).
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In what follows we will refer to the net utility of a
product also as product performance. Accordingly, by
inspecting a ﬁrm’s offering a consumer evaluates its
product performance.
Consumers can search for suitable products in two
ways: with or without the help of an intermediary.
The nonintermediated search cost incurred by con-
sumers visiting local retailers directly (corresponding
to the “shopping cost” in Chen et al. 2002, p. 428)
is assumed to be substantial. Not only does it con-
tain expenses for transportation but also—and maybe
more importantly—the opportunity cost of not get-
ting the most favorable deal. For example, regarding
the latter portion of the shopping cost, Chen et al.
(2002) indicate that in the market for automobiles the
average price obtained through an online intermedi-
ary is about two percent less than that paid at a local
retailer. Without loss of generality, we set any con-
sumer’s ex ante expected utility u0 from using the
outside option of visiting a retailer directly or using
another channel (and not using the search intermedi-
ary) to zero.
We assume that there is a search intermediary capa-
ble of reducing consumers’ shopping cost signiﬁ-
cantly, at least in expectation (Diehl et al. 2003).
Furthermore, inspecting (or “sampling”) each search
result is costly as it involves following the provided
referrals and evaluating product performance to reach
a purchase decision. The sampling cost for transactions
such as visiting and inspecting a ﬁrm’s site has empir-
ically been found to be considerable. As an exam-
ple, for a name-your-own-price retailer Hann and
Terwiesch (2003) ﬁnd a “frictional” cost of about $5
per e-business transaction. This is consistent with
observed search behavior of consumers who tend to
inspect very few sites prior to a purchase (cf. Foot-
note 2). In our model we allow consumers to be
heterogeneous with respect to their sampling cost c,
which is assumed to be distributed on a compact
support  ⊂ +. The corresponding cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) F is taken to be increasing
and continuously differentiable, but otherwise is com-
pletely arbitrary. We further suppose, at least initially,
that every consumer inspects the results in the order
they are obtained from the search intermediary. Thus,
depending on the prospects of having found the best
product offering, a portion k of the total number
of consumers C =  > 0 (per unit time interval)
Table 1 Summary of Notation
Symbol Explanation
= 1/1+ 2 (Maximum) value of a rank-one referral
k Number of consumers that search k times
(k ∈ 012)
f 
 →+ Density of consumers’ search costs on  ⊂+
g
 →+ Density of consumer surplus on ⊂2+
 ∈  Intermediary’s design parameter in the type
space = 01
bH  bL Respective bid of high- and low-type ﬁrm
u = uH − uL Difference between the ﬁrms’ product
performances uH and uL
= 
1−  u Intermediated utility difference
h
 →  Design homotopy (probability of high-type ﬁrm
being ranked ﬁrst)

k
u Expected surplus after k searches (k ∈ 12)
ˆ
1
u  Expected surplus after one search
given  (ˆ1u 0= 1u )
F I Firm F ’s (F ∈ LH) and intermediary I’s payoff
evaluate the ﬁrst k hits (k ∈ 0	1	2
) by the search
intermediary. We argue later (in our remarks before
Lemma 3) that this assumption of seemingly non-
strategic consumer behavior is in fact superﬂuous. As
a natural consequence of the model, we obtain that
in equilibrium consumers never have an incentive to
reverse their search order. Without any loss of gener-
ality we can normalize the total number of consumers
to one, i.e., C = 1. The main notation in our model is
summarized in Table 1.
Timing. The model consists of two periods: In the
ﬁrst period, the search intermediary chooses a “search
engine design” parameter  ∈ 0	1=, which speci-
ﬁes the weight that the intermediary’s ranking func-
tion r assigns to the ﬁrms’ respective bids versus their
true performance level ( = 0: no weight on product
performance/full weight on bids;  = 1: full weight
on product performance/none on bids). We assume
that the intermediary can gain knowledge about the
ﬁrms’ true performance level either by consulting
third-party information (such as consumer reports) or
through its own due diligence (e.g., expert directory
ranking produced by Yahoo!).6 For simplicity we
assume that after the design parameter  has been
6 Our analysis indicates that the intermediary wants to spend as
much on reliably evaluating the ﬁrms’ performance level as it can
gain by putting additional weight on product performance in the
ranking mechanism.
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Figure 1 Timing of Events
Firms’ problem Search intermediary’s problem Consumers’ problem
P
er
io
d 
1
P
er
io
d 
2
Intermediary chooses search
engine design parameter θ
2a
3
4
Firms decide about entering
the market
Product performances realize
Firms choose bids per
referral for search keywords
Intermediary ranks firms5
1
6 Consumers search by
keyword and sample
product information
Consumers purchase the
product that yields highest
net utility
7
2b Consumers decide whether to
use the search intermediary
chosen, the intermediary does credibly communicate
this parameter to ﬁrms and consumers. Alternately,
one may suppose that based on prior experience, both
ﬁrms and consumers have gained common knowl-
edge about  on which their further decisions can be
based. In some situations the intermediary may be
unable to either credibly communicate or commit to
a particular value of its design parameter . This is
the case, for example, when the allocation produced
by the intermediary’s mechanism cannot be immedi-
ately veriﬁed by the participating ﬁrms.7 Under such
circumstances ﬁrms would rationally assume that the
intermediary’s  corresponds to the one maximiz-
ing its proﬁts, an interpretation which exactly cor-
responds to the equilibrium outcome we ﬁnd. We
therefore, for the purposes of our discussion, adhere
to the ﬁrst interpretation of  as a deliberately chosen
design parameter which is credibly communicated to
all other players.
7 For example, even though an intermediary may have chosen to
communicate, say,  = 0 (i.e., no weight on product performance)
to ﬁrms, our results indicate that the intermediary may have an
incentive to actually use a different  
= 0 for ranking purposes, and
in the absence of a credible commitment this would be rationally
anticipated by the ﬁrms when submitting their bids and by con-
sumers when performing their searches.
After observing  ﬁrms and consumers decide—
at the end of period one—whether to use the search
engine or not (in the latter case they obtain the out-
side option’s payoff of zero). In the second period, the
ﬁrms’ product performances realize publicly and they
enter their respective open bids for each referral by
the search intermediary. Naturally these bids may be
shaded by strategic considerations, and we will show
in the next section that the only equilibrium with
nonzero bids is actually in mixed strategies, as is often
the case in rent-seeking games, e.g., in the war of attri-
tion (Maynard Smith 1974; Tirole 1988, pp. 311–312) or
in complete-information all-pay auctions (Baye et al.
1996). Based on the ﬁrms’ bids, their respective prod-
uct performance and the ranking function, the inter-
mediary then provides ranked search results to con-
sumers, who then decide about their purchases. Fig-
ure 1 provides an overview of the timeline in our
model. Next we discuss the strategic decision prob-
lems of the different parties in our model: consumers,
search intermediary, and ﬁrms.
Consumers. It is common knowledge among all
consumers that there are two competing companies
in the market that offer products of different net
utilities u1 and u2. In order to bound consumers’
expected surplus (as a function of their searches) from
Weber and Zheng: A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals
420 Information Systems Research 18(4), pp. 414–436, © 2007 INFORMS
below, let us ﬁrst consider the case where the search
intermediary (such as Yahoo!) puts full weight on the
ﬁrms’ bids (= 0), which ex ante are unknown to the
consumers.8 Note that the joint surplus distribution
allows for correlation in the consumers’ beliefs about
the two ﬁrms; its symmetry expresses the fact that the
ﬁrms are ex ante indistinguishable. The consumers’
common prior beliefs about the net utilities of the
available product offerings are jointly distributed over
the convex compact support ⊂ 2+ with symmetric
measurable probability density g (where gu1	u2 =
gu2	u1 for almost all u1	u2 ∈). The resulting net
expected utility uk c for any consumer of type c ∈
after k ∈= 0	1	2
 searches is given by
uk c=



k
u − kc	 if k ∈ 1	2
	
0	 if k= 0	
(1)
where ku is the expected highest surplus after
inspecting k products,9
1u =
∫

u1gu1	u2 du1	u2	
2u =
∫

maxu1	u2
gu1	u2 du1	u2
(2)
The optimal number of searches k∗c for a consumer
of type c is such that each additional search (includ-
ing the ﬁrst one) promises an expected incremental
payoff that outweighs the positive search cost c.10
While all consumers strategically perform searches
conditional on past observations (cf. Footnote 10), the
8 We assume that consumers are not able to condition their other-
wise strategic search behavior on an observation of the ﬁrms’ bids.
For example, 95 percent of the click-throughs generated from Over-
ture’s paid referrals originate from afﬁliated sites such as Yahoo!,
MSN, and Google, which do not disclose the ﬁrms’ bid amounts.
Overture shifted its practice of public bids to hidden bids in 2003.
9 The expressions ku in (2) correspond to the kth order statistics of
the jointly distributed surplus vector u1	u2.
10 Formally, the consumer’s choice in (1) is individually rational in
the sense that the ﬁrst search is worth it, u1 c ≥ u0 = 0, and
incentive compatible in the sense that each additional search adds a
net beneﬁt (conditional on past observations), k∗c = 1u1c≥u0
 +
1∫u2  u1	u2∈
maxu1	u2
gu2 u1 du2−c≥u1
, where the density gu2  u1 =
gu1	u2/
∫
uˆ2  u1	uˆ2∈
 gu1	 uˆ2 duˆ2 describes the consumer’s con-
ditional beliefs after observing u1, and 1·
 denotes the indicator
function.
expected number of searches for any given consumer
type c depends only on the order statistics in (2). More
speciﬁcally, let k ∈ 0	1 be the number of consumers
that are expected to search k ∈ times. The following
lemma clariﬁes how the k’s depend on a composition
of consumers’ sampling costs and their beliefs about
the net utilities. We will refer to a segment of con-
sumers who all search k times as “consumer search
class k.”
Lemma 1 (Consumer Search Classes). The parti-
tion of the consumer base  into search classes is given
by 2 = F 2u − 1u , 1 = F 1u  − 2, and 0 =
1− F 1u .
The above partitioning 0	1	2; cf. Figure 3) of
the consumer base  depends on the distribution of
the consumer sampling costs as well as on the con-
sumers’ prior beliefs about product performance. In
general it also depends on the design parameter ,
which had been ﬁxed up to now to = 0. For higher ,
consumers are less likely to inspect more than the ﬁrst
search result, since the likelihood of ﬁnding the best
ﬁrm by following the “rank-one referral” increases.
Search Intermediary. The search intermediary
bases an internal rank score r , with which it displays
the search results, on the “bid” b received by a ﬁrm
and on this ﬁrm’s product performance, measured in
consumer surplus u. We deﬁne the “search engine
design”  ∈ 0	1= as the relative weight between
the two,11
rb	u= u+ 1− b (3)
The bid amount b is thereby payable for every refer-
ral, irrespective of actual consumer purchase (con-
version). This ﬁrm’s total payment for referrals is
therefore dependent on the number of inspections by
consumers, and it is clear that for a given ﬁrm this
generally results in a tradeoff between being highly
ranked and having to pay for a large number of “irrel-
evant” hits from consumers.
Clearly, for  = 1 (full ranking weight on product
performance) all consumers simply inspect at most
11 In Appendix C we show that all results in this paper remain qual-
itatively unchanged when choosing a more general ranking func-
tion that is increasing in a ﬁrm’s bid and product performance and
where the design parameter is chosen such as to index its sensitiv-
ity with respect to product performance relative to its sensitivity
with respect to a ﬁrm’s bid.
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the ﬁrst search result and thus 2=1 must be zero.
All consumers who ﬁnd it incentive compatible to
search once can expect a surplus of 2u . Since all
underlying functions are smooth, it is reasonable to
expect that for a general search engine design the
partition (0	1	2)() of the consumer base depends
smoothly on the parameter  ∈ . More speciﬁcally,
we assume that there exists a continuously differen-
tiable function12 h → such that h is nondecreas-
ing in , h0= 1−h1= 0, and
ˆ1u = 1−h1u +h2u (4)
is the consumers’ expected surplus from searching
once, given a search engine of design . We demon-
strate below (cf. Proposition 3) that h corresponds
to the equilibrium probability and also the consumers’
beliefs that the ﬁrm with the higher product performance is
listed ﬁrst. In expectation, a type-c consumer searches
a second time, if given  the cost c of inspecting
an additional product does not exceed the expected
gain 2u − ˆ1u of an additional search (cf. Figure 2).
As a direct consequence from Lemma 1 we obtain the
following more general “intermediated” partition of
the consumer base.13
Lemmma 2 (Intermediated Consumer Search
Classes). For a given search engine design  ∈  and
appropriate continuous mapping h in (4), the segmenta-
tion of the consumer base  into search classes is given
by 2 = F 2u − ˆ1u , 1 = F ˆ1u − 2,
and 0= 1− F ˆ1u .
Lemma 2 states that consumers who are expected
to search twice have a search cost c that does not
exceed the expected incremental beneﬁt 2u −1u of
12 From a topological standpoint this corresponds to a homotopic
mapping that connects all search engine designs (Guillemin and
Pollack 1974). We assume that the mapping h is smooth, i.e., con-
tinuously differentiable, so that differential calculus can be used to
obtain a ﬁrst-order necessary optimality condition when maximiz-
ing the intermediary’s revenues with respect to  (cf. Proposition 4).
The existence of a function h with these properties in equilibrium
is rigorously justiﬁed through relation (23) in §3.
13 The segmentation of the consumer base into search classes can
also be formulated in terms of indifferent consumers c1	 c2 ∈ ,
where type ck is indifferent between searching k times and k − 1
times: c2 = F −12 and c1 = F −11+2, cf. Figure 3. Note that c1 =
ˆ1u and c2 =2u − ˆ1u , so that 0≤ c2 ≤ c1 ≤ 1.
Figure 2 Consumers Trade Off Sampling Cost Against an Increase in
Expected Utility
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searching twice instead of once, times the probabil-
ity 1−h that the ﬁrm with the lower-performing
product is listed ﬁrst. Similarly, consumers who are
expected to search at least once have a search cost that
does not exceed the expected value ˆ1u  of search-
ing once in equilibrium.
The search intermediary’s ﬁrst-period optimal
design problem is to ﬁnd a design parameter  that
maximizes expected revenues given the resulting con-
sumer behavior and ﬁrms’ optimal bidding policies.
We can see that the total number of consumers using
the search engine, (1 + 2), increases in , whereas
the expected total number of referrals, (1+22), does
not have to be monotonic in .14 Naturally the num-
ber of consumers in the system inﬂuences the “stakes”
for the companies, tending to increase the bids if the
magnitude of search class one is large compared to
the magnitude of search class two, i.e., if 1  2.
On the other hand, as  increases, the ﬁrm with the
lower performance level needs to outbid the high-
performance ﬁrm by a larger amount to secure rank-
one referrals despite its lack in product performance.
However, if  is close enough to 1, the lower ﬁrm will
stop bidding altogether as the bids needed to win a
rank-one referral exceed its expected value, which in
turn reduces the incentives of the high-performance
ﬁrm to bid, reducing overall intermediary revenues.
From this it is clear that generally the intermediary
14 From the expressions (A9)–(A10) for ′1 and 
′
2 in the proof of
Proposition 4 it follows directly that ′1 +′2 > 0, whereas ′1 + 2′2
is not necessarily sign-deﬁnite.
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Figure 3 Intermediated Consumer Search Classes
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will seek an intermediary search engine design ∗ in
the interior of  to maximize revenues.
The Firms’ Bidding Problem. At the beginning of
the second period the (hitherto unknown) random
net utilities, u1	u2 ∈, of the ﬁrms’ product offerings
realize. A net utility ui corresponds to ﬁrm i’s perfor-
mance type. The ﬁrms simultaneously submit bids to
the intermediary for referrals. It turns out that a ﬁrm’s
bidding strategy depends only on whether or not its
performance type is higher or lower than that of the
other ﬁrm. Hence, we say that ﬁrm i is of “high” per-
formance type (or simply of high type), abbreviated
by H , if
ui =maxu1	u2
≡ uH (5)
Similarly, ﬁrm j is of low type, if
uj =minu1	u2
≡ uL (6)
Note that the probability that uH = uL is zero,
because u1, u2 are two independent draws of the net
consumer surplus. For simplicity, once the net utili-
ties have realized we refer to the ﬁrms by their type
j ∈ L	H
 rather than their index i ∈ 1	2
. Firm j’s
proﬁt j depends on the search rank rbj	uj 
achieved through its bid, the other ﬁrm’s search rank
(which determines if j wins the auction or not), and
its margin, which we normalize for both ﬁrms to
one.15 If both ﬁrms achieve the same rank, then the
search intermediary will adopt the tiebreaking rule of
displaying ﬁrm H with the better performing product
ﬁrst (note that ProbuH = uL= 0).
15 The analysis remains essentially unchanged for any positive (pos-
sibly asymmetric) proﬁt margins mL, mH , as long as mH ≥ mL.
Firm H with the better-performing product can price in equilib-
rium at least as high as the other ﬁrm and thus, ceteris paribus,
3. Equilibrium Strategies
At the end of the second period consumers form their
beliefs h about the probability that the high-type
ﬁrm is ranked ﬁrst. Based on Lemma 2 this deter-
mines the intermediated consumer search classes, i.e.,
the partition 0	1	2)( of the consumer base . At
the beginning of this period each of the two competing
ﬁrms learns its type j ∈ L	H
 (from the realizations
of u1	u2 ∈) and the corresponding expected payoffs
as a function of its bids (relative to the consumers’
beliefs). The ﬁrms’ respective payoffs are given by
HbL	 bH
=


1+21− bH	 if rbH	uH≥ rbL	uL	
21− bH	 if rbH	uH < rbL	uL	
(7)
and
LbL	 bH
=


−2bL	 if rbH	uH≥ rbL	uL	
−2bL+11− bL	 if rbH	uH < rbL	uL	
(8)
where as before rbj	uj= rbj	uj  for j ∈ L	H
. To
simplify the exposition we have dropped the explicit
dependence on . Firm H is thereby ranked ﬁrst by
the intermediary, if and only if the condition
rbH	uH≥ rbL	uL ⇔ bH ≥ bL−

1−  uH −uL (9)
is satisﬁed. Maximizing ﬁrm j’s proﬁt function with
respect to bj in (7)–(8) we obtain the best-response cor-
respondences16
b∗HbL = argmax
bH≥0
HbL	 bH
=


bL−"+	 if bL ≤ +"	
0	 if bL ≥ +"	
(10)
obtains at least the same margin as the ﬁrm of type L. In the
event where mL > mH one can show that the notion of high-
performing versus low-performing may be reversed if ﬁrms’ per-
formance differences are small. In addition, this distinction will
then also depend on the design parameter . The model can then
still be solved if one allows the surplus distributions to depend
on ; however, to keep our model simple and analytically tractable
we exclude this somewhat implausible situation.
16 The correspondences are set-valued at the points of indifference.
In (10) we use the notation b+ =max0	 b
 for any b ≥ 0.
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and
b∗LbH = argmax
bL≥0
LbL	 bH
=


bH +"+ #	 if bH ≤ −"− #	
0	 if bH ≥ −"− #	
(11)
where we deﬁne  as “(maximum) value of a rank-
one referral,” i.e., unit margin times the fraction of
searching consumers who sample only the ﬁrst search
result,
= 1/1+2 ∈ 0	1	 (12)
and " as the “intermediated utility difference,”
"= 
1−  uH −uL≥ 0 (13)
It represents the cash equivalent (excluding the addi-
tional increment #) by which the low-type ﬁrm has
to overbid the high-type ﬁrm to win a rank-one
referral. We now examine the second-period bid-
ding game $.17 The value of a rank-one refer-
ral corresponds to the value (on a per-referral basis)
of winning the intermediary’s auction. As a conse-
quence, no bid can rationally exceed . The constant
#> 0 corresponds to the smallest monetary bid incre-
ment accepted by the search intermediary.18 A pure-
strategy equilibrium of this auction can exist only
if the corresponding consumer beliefs h ∈ 0	1

about the probability of the high type’s winning
reﬂect the ﬁrms’ equilibrium bidding strategies. Let
us ﬁrst examine the case where h = 0, i.e., when
the low-type ﬁrm is sure to be listed ﬁrst in equi-
librium. Then, consistent with their beliefs, all con-
sumers would start their search with the second rank,
so that the value of a rank-one referral becomes zero.
As a result, both ﬁrms would bid zero, which implies
that the high-type ﬁrm would win with probability
one, inconsistent with the consumers’ beliefs. We now
consider the case when h = 1, i.e., the consumers
17 The set of players is  = L	H
, the players’ strategy sets are
j =+ for j ∈ , so that $=  	 j 
	 L·	H·

.
18 We assume that # is “small” (e.g., 1¢ in the case of Overture),
in particular less than the smallest possible value of a rank-one
referral, =0. Note that  is nondecreasing in  (cf. the proof of
Proposition 4).
believe that the high-type ﬁrm is sure to win the
auction, and therefore rbH	uH ≥ rbL	uL has
to hold in equilibrium. Then all consumers search
exactly once, so that 1 = = 1. From (7) and (8) we
can see that Firm L would prefer to lose the auction
if any only if bL ≥ 1 while ﬁrm H would agree to win
the auction (at a bid of bH = bL − ") if bH ≤ 1. Thus,
there exists a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria.
However, it turns out that these pure-strategy equi-
libria vanish if there is an arbitrarily small number
of “noisy clicks” in the system, which could be the
result of small deviations from full rationality by con-
sumers, causing them to make a mistake from time to
time when following the online referrals.
Proposition 1 (Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria).
Let  ∈. (i) The bidding-strategy proﬁle b∗L	 b∗H= 1+
%	1+%−" constitutes a pure-strategy equilibrium of the
bidding game $ for all % ∈ 0	". (ii) If, as a result
of noisy clicks, 2 > 0, then a pure-strategy equilibrium
of $ does not exist.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that similar to a
separating equilibrium in the Spence signaling game
(cf. Footnote 4) there exists a continuum of pure-
strategy equilibria for which the consumers are able
to distinguish the ﬁrms by their ranking (with
ﬁrm H being ranked ﬁrst). Most of these equilib-
ria are (Kaldor-Hicks) “inefﬁcient” in the sense that
ﬁrm L’s equilibrium bid critically depends on the
assumption that it never wins the auction (all con-
sumers search only once), increasing the minimum
bid required for ﬁrm H . The latter would be will-
ing to avoid the high bids by a side payment to
ﬁrm L. Note in particular that all pure-strategy equi-
libria are such that ﬁrm L is never required to actu-
ally pay and that the ranking function produces the
same value for ﬁrm L and ﬁrm H , i.e., rbL	uL≡
rbH	uH. Part (ii) of Proposition 1 notes that if
ﬁrm L can expect a nonzero number of clicks, then
all of the pure-strategy equilibria must vanish, as
ﬁrm L is never able to offset the associated cost. From
part (ii) we conclude that the pure-strategy equilib-
ria are not robust, and therefore examine the possibil-
ity of mixed-strategy equilibria, which turn out to be
unique and robust with respect to noisy clicks.
For a given rank-one-referral value  and an
intermediated utility difference " Figure 4 depicts
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Figure 4 Best-Response Correspondences for  ∈ 0 ¯
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the ﬁrms’ best-response correspondences in the bid-
ding game $. It can readily be veriﬁed that their
intersection is empty. For example, starting with a bid
amount bL ∈ "	, we see by tracing the ﬁrms’ best
responses successively that both ﬁrms will tend to bid
until one of them drops out, upon which the ﬁrms
start bidding up again.19 It is crucial that ≤",
or equivalently that
 < ¯= ¯
¯+ uH −uL
	 (14)
since otherwise ﬁrm L would need to (with posi-
tive probability) bid more than the rank-one referral
value  to ever be able to win the auction, which is
a dominated strategy. The search intermediary there-
fore has a natural incentive to keep the design param-
eter  below a critical value ¯. This makes plain the
search intermediary’s desire to limit the transparency
of the provided search results, a pervasive managerial
insight in intermediated search markets. If the search
engine design is such that the weight on product per-
formance is high with  ≥ ¯, then a mixed-strategy bid
equilibrium does not exist. The intermediated utility
difference in (13) is too large for the low-type ﬁrm to
be able to win the auction at a gain. The cash equiva-
lent of this difference exceeds the value of a rank-one
referral, i.e., "≥ .
19 Weber and Zheng (2002) observed intertemporal bid cycles.
Recent work by Edelman et al. (2007), and Zhang and Feng (2005)
addresses the corresponding cyclical “sawtooth” bidding behavior
more formally in a dynamic setting.
Proposition 2 (Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilib-
rium). Let  ∈ 0	 ¯. Then there is a unique mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium of $, which is given by the
following probability distributions of bids:
P ∗Hz=ProbbH≤z =
1−z+"
1−z−" (15)
for ﬁrm H , and
Q∗Ly = ProbbL ≤ y  
=


y−y−"
1− y+" 	 y ≥"	
"/	 y ≤"	
(16)
for ﬁrm L.20
In the case where the search engine design allows
ﬁrm L to in principle win a rank-one referral at a
gain (i.e.,  > "), then the only Nash equilibrium
of the open-bidding game $ is in mixed strate-
gies, where both ﬁrms L and H randomize over
their bids.21 The mixed-strategy equilibrium found in
this search market implies a bid dispersion that is
somewhat related to equilibrium price dispersions
noted earlier in search markets (Varian 1980). Figure 5
20 The corresponding densities p∗Hz   and q∗Ly   can be obtained
via (generalized) differentiation,
p∗Hz   a.e.=
1−
1−"− z2 rect
(
z
−"
)
+ 1−"
1−",z	
for ﬁrm H , and
q∗Ly   a.e.=
1+"−
1+"− y2 rect
(
y−"
−"
)
+ "

,y	
for ﬁrm L, where we have omitted the dependence on  on the
right-hand sides, for simplicity. The Dirac distribution ,· is such
that ,y = 0 for all y 
= 0 and ∫ #−# ,ydy = 1 for any # > 0. The
rectangular function rect· is deﬁned by recty = 1 for y ∈ 0	1
and recty= 0 otherwise. Note that when "> 0 there is a positive
probability of either ﬁrm bidding zero.
21 The mixed-strategy equilibrium speciﬁed in Proposition 2 sup-
poses uncorrelated strategy proﬁles. In addition there may be cor-
related equilibria (Aumann 1974) if ﬁrms can coordinate on an
appropriate interbid correlation (e.g., by using a public random-
izing device). Naturally in the realistic (and empirically observed)
setting of a dynamic bidding game, bids are typically correlated
(cf. Appendix B, Figure B.1). Our theory is limited to the ﬁrm’s
one-shot (or repeated myopic) equilibrium behavior, which natu-
rally also constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
inﬁnitely repeated game.
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Figure 5 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium of   (10,000 Simulated Bids) for = 1/5
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depicts the mixed-strategy equilibrium. In order to
achieve mutual indifference (the deﬁning condition
for a mixed-strategy equilibrium), both ﬁrms when
randomizing need to make higher bid amounts pro-
gressively more likely. Note that these mixed-strategy
proﬁles contain generally nonzero atoms, in particular
whenever "> 0 and < 1.22
As a consequence of Proposition 2 we can deter-
mine both ﬁrms’ expected bids,
b¯∗H=
∫ −"
0
zdP ∗Hz=
1

(
−"+1−ln 1−
1−"
)
	 (17)
and
b¯∗L =
∫ 
"
y dQ∗Ly
= 1

1+"−"+1+"−ln1+"−	 (18)
22 The existence of the mixed strategy proﬁles also follows from
Simon (1987), as the ﬁrms’ payoffs (7)–(8) satisfy the “comple-
mentary discontinuity property.” The well-known earlier existence
result for mixed-strategy equilibria in games with discontinuous
payoffs by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) does not allow for such
atoms.
where " ∈ 0	. For not too high values of  it
is b¯∗H < b¯
∗
L, which stresses the importance the pres-
ence of the low-type ﬁrm has for the intermediary.
However, there are cases (for large  and small ") in
which b¯∗H > b¯
∗
L; in those situations the value of a rank-
one referral  is very high and the bid-advantage
through better product performance relatively low, so
that the high-type ﬁrm ends up bidding higher on
average. Note also that the bids are generally not vis-
ible to consumers, and as a consequence bids cannot
act as a signal separating the ﬁrms’ types in expec-
tation. In addition, even if ﬁrm L bids higher than
ﬁrm H , its probability of winning the auction can
never reach a value above 05, the critical value above
which consumers would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to inspect
the second referral ﬁrst. However, the latter switch in
consumer behavior cannot occur, because ﬁrm H by
mimicking ﬁrm L could always preempt it through a
simple bid increase. Lastly, we remark that, in con-
trast to the pure-strategy equilibria in Proposition 1,
the mixed-strategy equilibrium is robust with respect
to noisy clicks in the sense that the cost of additional
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random consumers that search twice can be offset (in
expectation) by a small random number of additional
consumers that only search once. Because ﬁrm H can
(for  > 0) expect a positive proﬁt, its participation is
not sensitive to noisy clicks.
Lemma 3 (Expected Firm Proﬁts in Equilibrium).
i Let uH > uL and  ∈ 0	 ¯. At the beginning of the
second period, the expected ﬁrm proﬁts in equilibrium
are ∗H = 2 + 1 + 2" and ∗L = 0. (ii) Each ﬁrm’s
ex ante expected proﬁts =∗F at the beginning of the ﬁrst
period are
=∗F =
2
2
+ 1
2
(
1Prob"≥ + 1+2
·E" "<Prob"< )	 (19)
where " = /1− ,u with ,u = uH − uL the surplus
difference between the two ﬁrms.
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, at t = 2
ﬁrm L expects zero proﬁts, even though in many cases
it is ﬁrm L that expects to bid more than ﬁrm H . Even
conditional on having realized uL, it is (according
to (18)) still incentive compatible for ﬁrm L to expect
to bid a positive amount leading to zero expected
proﬁts.23 However, ex ante (at t = 1) both ﬁrms have
symmetric expectations about their types, and thus
both generally expect a positive proﬁt of =∗F accord-
ing to part (ii) of Lemma 3. From expression (19) it is
clear that both ﬁrms would prefer ex ante full trans-
parency, i.e., a search engine design ∗F = 1 with full
weight on product performance. It is clear that =∗F can-
not exceed 1 + 2/2, i.e., half of the total surplus
to be shared between ﬁrms and intermediary. Setting
= 1 implies that Prob"≥ = 1, so that this upper
bound is achieved. We note, however, that given a
certain design  < 1, it may be the case that the
ﬁrms would locally prefer less transparency, i.e., the
intermediary’s placing a higher weight on the ﬁrms’
bids. In other words, =∗F  may be nonmonotonic
with respect to .24 Because  is nondecreasing
23 This is also realistic, because at this point the cost of goods sold
is already sunk.
24 The slope of
=
∗F  with respect to  becomes negative when the
loss from the decrease in twice-searching consumers is outweighed
by the gains from the overall increase in consumers who search.
in  (cf. Lemma 2) one obtains—in view of rela-
tion (14)—that as long as  does not exceed some crit-
ical value
=
 ∈ (which is a lower bound for ¯ in (14)),
 ≤ 0
0+maxu1	u2∈ u1−u2
≡ = ≤¯	 (20)
expression (19) for ex ante expected ﬁrm proﬁts sim-
pliﬁes to
=∗F = 12 2+ 1+2"¯	 (21)
where "¯ = /1− ,¯u is the expected intermedi-
ated utility difference and ,¯u = E,u is the expected
product-performance difference. Relation (20) ensures
that (14) is satisﬁed for any possible surplus
realizations.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Search Behavior).
For any  ∈ 0	 ¯ the consumers’ equilibrium search behav-
ior is determined by the following system of equations:


=1−F 2u −ˆ1u /F ˆ1u 	
ˆ
1
u =
∫

/u2−u1	u2+1−/u2−u1	u1
·gu1	u2du1	u2	
/u2−u1	=
"

+ 1−+"
2"2
(
−""+1−
·ln 1−
1−"1−+"
)∣∣∣∣"=u2−u1/1−	
(22)
where 2u is given by (2), and / denotes the probability
density that the high-type ﬁrm wins the rank-one refer-
ral. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, all consumers inspect
only the ﬁrst link, so that  ≡ 1 and ˆ1u  ≡ 2u ,
where 2u is given by (2).
In the interesting case where  ∈ 0	 ¯, the equi-
librium system in Proposition 3 determines the con-
sumers’ search behavior in the sense that the sizes of
the intermediated consumer search classes, 1 and 2,
as well as the function h in (4), which was used to
construct the equilibrium, are obtained from a solu-
tion 	 ˆ1u 	/ to (22) as follows:


1= F ˆ1u − F 2u − ˆ1u 	
2= F 2u − ˆ1u 	
h= 1− 2u −1u −12u − ˆ1u 
(23)
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The dependence of the consumers’ search behavior
in a mixed-strategy equilibrium becomes apparent by
inspecting (22) and (23): as  ∈ 0	 ¯ increases, ˆ1u 
increases, so that 1 also increases while 2
decreases. The value h corresponds to the con-
sumers’ beliefs about the probability that ﬁrm H is
listed ﬁrst, which are correct in equilibrium. We note
that h is continuous and increases in equilibrium
(with h0= 1−h1= 0), as posited in §2.
4. Search Engine Design
We now solve the intermediary’s ﬁrst-stage problem
of ﬁnding an optimal (public) weighting parameter 
that trades off between product performance and bids
in the ranking function. The intermediary’s second-
period proﬁts I as a function of the ﬁrms’ bids
bL	 bH are given by
IbL	 bH
= 2bL+ bH+


1bH	 if rbH	uH≥ rbL	uL	
1bL	 if rbH	uH < rbL	uL
(24)
Using the results in Proposition 2 we can determine
the intermediary’s expected proﬁts in the mixed-
strategy bidding equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Expected Intermediary Proﬁts in
Equilibrium). The search intermediary’s ex ante expected
equilibrium proﬁts are given by
=∗I = 1−1+2E" "<Prob"<	 (25)
where " is given as in Lemma 3.
Analogous to our remark after Lemma 3, as long
as (20) holds, expression (25) simpliﬁes to
=∗I = 1
(
1− "¯

)
= 1− 1+2"¯ (26)
In the ﬁrst period (at t = 1), i.e., at the time when
the mechanism is designed, the intermediary does
not know the product performance of the respective
ﬁrms. Because in equilibrium the intermediary’s prior
beliefs are distributed in the same way as those of
the consumers, the search engine design itself does
not depend on the product performance of the ﬁrms
present in the market. At the beginning of period 2,
the intermediary obtains information about the ﬁrms’
respective product performance levels, before con-
sumers start their search. It becomes clear below that
the intermediary generally has a strict incentive to
obtain such information, e.g., as a result of its own
product testing, or using third-party data. The rank-
ing thus occurs under complete information, whereas
the search engine design is chosen under incomplete
information: the intermediary expects a surplus dis-
persion of ,¯u = EuH −uL.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Search Engine Design).
Assume that at an optimal search engine design ∗
condition (20) holds. Then the intermediary’s optimal
ﬁrst-period search engine needs to satisfy
dˆ
1
u 
d
∣∣∣∣
=∗
≤ F ˆ
1
u ∗
1− ∗1−∗ ,¯uf ˆ1u ∗+ f 2u − ˆ1u ∗
,¯u
1− ∗2 	
(27)
whereby equality in (27) holds whenever the optimum is
interior, so that ∗ > 0.
Provided that an optimal search engine design ∗
satisﬁes condition (20), this design must be such that
the increase of consumers in the system is balanced
against the tendency of ﬁrms to reduce their bids
when the weight on product performance is very
large. The left-hand side of (27) is equal to
h′∗2u −1u  and corresponds to the change of
the probability that ﬁrm H wins the auction, times
the expected (nonintermediated) gain from search-
ing twice over searching once. The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side is akin to a hazard rate, while second
term is the expected utility difference, weighted by
the design parameter.
Note that relation (27) provides a necessary con-
dition for the optimal search engine design ∗: due
to nonconvexities in the input distributions, condi-
tion (27) may allow for several solutions correspond-
ing to local extrema of the intermediary’s ex ante
expected proﬁts. As long as h′′ > 0 (implying a fast
increase of the consumers’ expected payoff in ), con-
dition (27) implies that the optimal weight on prod-
uct performance decreases as the expected difference
in product performance increases, which indicates the
Weber and Zheng: A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals
428 Information Systems Research 18(4), pp. 414–436, © 2007 INFORMS
intermediary’s desire to maintain incentives for the
low-type ﬁrm to participate with nonzero bids. In case
the simplifying condition (20) is not satisﬁed, the opti-
mal search engine design ∗ maximizes the interme-
diary’s proﬁt (25) in which one needs to substitute
the equilibrium quantities 1, 2, , and "
that can be obtained by solving the equilibrium sys-
tem (22). The corresponding one-dimensional maxi-
mization problem can then be solved numerically.
We now contrast the intermediary-optimal design
to a design that maximizes overall welfare. Because in
equilibrium consumers of search classes 1 and 2 even-
tually purchase a product, the total ex ante expected
consumer surplus is
CS =
∫ c2
0
2u −2cf cdc+
∫ c1
c2
ˆ1u −cf cdc
= 1ˆ1u +22u −
∫ c1
0
cf cdc−
∫ c2
0
cf cdc (28)
Overall (ex ante) social welfare W in the system is
then deﬁned as the sum of ex ante expected ﬁrm
proﬁts, intermediary proﬁts and consumer surplus,
so that W = 1 + 2 + CS. The following proposi-
tion provides a necessary optimality condition for a
welfare-maximizing search engine design, provided
that condition (20) holds at the optimum.
Proposition 5 (Consumer-Surplus and Welfare-
Maximizing Design). (i) Consumer surplus is non-
decreasing in the design parameter . (ii) The unique
ex ante social-welfare maximizing search engine design is
to rank based exclusively on product performance by set-
ting ∗W = 1.
Unlike the ﬁrms (as seen in the previous section,
cf. Footnote 24), consumers always prefer a maxi-
mum of transparency, which is then also socially opti-
mal as the pie 1 + 2 to be shared between ﬁrms
and intermediary increases in the weight  on prod-
uct performance. As a result obfuscation is socially
wasteful: the intermediary’s self-interested behav-
ior of choosing a revenue-maximizing design intro-
duces systematic obfuscation into the market place,
which—even though anticipated by the consumers—
limits the transparency of the resulting intermediated
search market. From a public policy perspective a
larger degree of transparency may be desirable. It
may be achieved through private and/or public-
sector organizations such as SearchEngineWatch.com
Figure 6 Expected Equilibrium Proﬁts for  ∈ 0= in the Example
Profits
Design
parameter θ
1/2
1/3
1/12
0
(α1 + α2)(θ)
πI (θ)=*
πF(θ)
θ* θ
=
*
=
(which reveals the performances of various search
engines and thus indirectly enforces market disci-
pline) or the Federal Trade Commission (which may
act upon receiving consumer complaints).
Example. As a practical illustration of our results
(cf. Figure 6), we now consider the concrete case in
which the probability densities f and g are constant
on  = 0	1 and = 0	12 respectively. Under this
speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that (for  = 0) the consumer’s
expected surplus after one search is 1u = 1/2 and
after two searches it is 2u = 2/3. Hence, by Lemma 2
and (23) the intermediated consumer search classes
are given by 1 = 2ˆ1u  − 2/3 and 2 =
2/3− ˆ1u . On the other hand, from (22) we obtain
that the consumers’ expected beneﬁt from searching
once using the search intermediary is
ˆ1u = 13 + 2
∫ 1
0
/s	 1− ss ds	
where the probability / that the high-type ﬁrm wins a
rank-one referral in a mixed-strategy bidding equilib-
rium is given by the last relation in (23) with =
1/3 + ˆ1u . By (20) we know that for  ≤ = =
0/0+ 1 = 2/5 the intermediary is guaranteed
a nontrivial mixed-strategy equilibrium. Maximizing
the intermediary’s expected proﬁts 1 − 1 +
2"¯= 2−/31− ˆ1u −2/3 with respect
to the design parameter , we ﬁnd ∗ ≈ 034, lead-
ing to an optimal expected equilibrium proﬁt of
=∗I ≈ 039, a 17% improvement over its expected equi-
librium proﬁts of 1/3 at  = 0. Taking the socially
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optimal solution ∗W = ∗F = 1 as a benchmark, the
intermediary reduces ex ante consumer surplus CS=
2/9− 2/3− ˆ1u ˆ1u  by 23% from CS∗W =
2/9 ≈ 02222 to CS∗ ≈ 01712. Similarly, the num-
ber of consumers using the engine is reduced by 13%,
from 2/3 to about 05786. We should note, however,
that in the absence of the intermediary consumers
would expect u0, i.e., only zero surplus. 
5. Conclusion
In this section we discuss managerial implications
of our results and theoretical contributions of this
research, including its current limitations. We then
provide some directions for further research.
Managerial Implications. Let us ﬁrst consider our
important conclusions regarding the design of a mech-
anism for selling paid referrals. If consumers observe
bids and the weight on product performance in the
ranking function is greater than zero, then consumers
could rationally infer that in expectation bids from
the lower-performance ﬁrm would be (weakly) higher
and adjust their search order accordingly, starting
their inspections with the ﬁrm bidding less. How-
ever, this would in turn (by a process of “unravel-
ing”) remove the incentive for the lower-performance
ﬁrm to bid at all and thus result in a zero-bid equilib-
rium unfavorable for the intermediary. On the other
hand, if the intermediary places no weight on product
performance in its ranking function, then by Propo-
sition 2 (for " = 0) we obtain a symmetric bidding
equilibrium in mixed strategies and consumers can-
not infer anything (even in expectation) from the
observed bid amounts; they thus do not have any
incentive to change their order of inspection to any-
thing different from the order the intermediary pro-
vides to them. Naturally, market transparency would
be minimal in that case, to the detriment of con-
sumers, by Lemma 2 resulting in a minimum number
of consumers (1 + 2) using the intermediary’s site.
We can thus conclude that if the ﬁrms’ bid amounts
are known to the consumers, then it is optimal for
the intermediary to base the ranking purely on the
bid amounts, which is the current choice of leading
search intermediaries such as Yahoo! or Nextag. How-
ever, when the ﬁrms’ bid amounts are not known
to the consumers, as is the case with 95 percent of
Overture’s click-throughs (which take place at afﬁli-
ates’ sites), then we argue that it is possible for the
intermediary to increase revenues by choosing an
optimal search engine design parameter ∗ ∈ 0	1 in
accordance with Proposition 4. If it turns out to be
proﬁtable to use the ﬁrms’ product performance (or
a correlated indicator such as consumer feedback) in
the ranking (i.e., ∗ > 0), then the intermediary would
rationally spend an amount, which at most equals its
expected gains of =I∗−=I0, to obtain this product
performance information (from third parties or own
research; cf. also Footnote 3). We note that in order
to optimize the search engine design, the intermedi-
ary needs to have some beliefs about the consumers’
search cost and the surplus of the ﬁrms’ products (in
terms of the cfd’s F and G).
Given a search engine design  > 0, the ﬁrms’ equi-
librium bidding strategies in Proposition 2 are such
that often (but not always!) it is best for a low-type
ﬁrm to bid higher in expectation than the high-type
ﬁrm, in order to take advantage of 1-consumers
with high sampling cost. In fact, it is the presence
of a low-type ﬁrm and the externality it exerts on a
high-type ﬁrm that generates revenue for the search
intermediary (cf. also Bandyopadhyay et al. 2005).
The low-type ﬁrm, in trying to obtain rents from
1-consumers, spends all its expected surplus on bid-
ding, whereas the high-type ﬁrm which obtains rents
from both 1- and 2-consumers, spends as much on
bidding so as to make the low-type ﬁrm in equi-
librium indifferent between staying in and dropping
out. The more the low-type ﬁrm sees its chances
in using a high search-ranking to sell to consumers
with a high opportunity cost of time, the more rent
a search intermediary is able to appropriate, thereby
naturally limiting the transparency of the market. As
a perhaps surprising conclusion, we have seen at the
end of §3 (cf. Footnote 24) that it may be sometimes
(at least locally) not only in the intermediary’s but
also in the ﬁrms’ best interest to limit transparency,
i.e., to decrease the search engine design parameter .
In contrast to this, consumers always prefer higher
transparency, as it increases their expected utility
from inspecting the most promising (rank-one) refer-
ral. The presence of the search intermediary in our
model is generally welfare improving (though natu-
rally not welfare maximizing), in contrast to Posner’s
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(1975) “dissipation” and “wastefulness” postulates
alluded to in §1. We have shown that the intermediary
manages to appropriate all of the expected rents of
the low-performance ﬁrm, which tends to bid higher
expected amounts for rank-one referrals than its high-
performance competitor to compensate for this per-
formance difference. As a result, given the weighted
average that a revenue-maximizing search intermedi-
ary is likely to choose in its ranking function, con-
sumers should be concerned about the endogenous
obfuscation in the search results provided by an infor-
mation intermediary, and adapt their behavior, which
in turn will tend to moderate the intermediary’s
opportunistic course of action.
Contributions and Limitations. Our paper is
among the ﬁrst attempts to address mechanism
design issues for search intermediaries. We provide
a model of an intermediated search market, whereby
the intermediary adopts a bidding model for sell-
ing referrals to competing ﬁrms, as is the current
practice of many leading search intermediaries. The
resulting auction with interdependent valuations is in
reality complicated by the fact that actual payments
occur stochastically, only when consumers actually
click through on the referrals provided by the inter-
mediary. To make the model tractable we assumed a
single bidding round, so that some of the dynamic
traits found in the data, such as end-of-day effects,
weekend dropouts, or interbid correlation, cannot be
replicated in our single-period model. Our empiri-
cal observations (cf. Appendix B) can thus serve only
as anecdotal evidence (as is the case with most data
when trying to conﬁrm game-theoretical conclusions),
and we hope that further research can shed more light
on the intertemporal bidding behavior of ﬁrms, which
interestingly is (in light of the ﬁrms’ often very signif-
icant total expenditures on paid referrals) sometimes
aided by “bidding agents.” We believe that the mix-
ing of bids that can be found in the data corroborates
our rent-seeking interpretation and that the results
of our model can be widely applied where referrals
are common practice, such as in real estate, the law,
accounting, and medicine. Our results can also be
applied to brokerages, where referral payments are
generally not observable by the end consumer. The
generic lack of transparency in equilibrium can also
be interpreted as a consequence of an intermediary’s
inability to commit to a speciﬁc ranking function, if
allocations are not fully veriﬁable by the participating
ﬁrms. Such a lack of commitment ability can naturally
be expected in at least some of the aforementioned
industries.
Directions for Future Research. As The Economist
(2002, pp. 23 and 24) noted, “the Internet is being
transformed, from a vast repository of mostly free
content into a commercial cauldron in which almost
everything is available ... [e]ven Internet search
terms.” In this paper, which is part of a larger research
program on search efﬁciency, we attempt to shed
some light on this phenomenon of decreasing trans-
parency on the Internet by constructing an empiri-
cally validated model of paid referrals in this inter-
mediated search environment. Future research could
proceed along the following three axes: (1) formulate
the referral auction as a dynamic game and examine
the resulting intertemporal bidding strategies, which
can then be directly compared to the available time-
series bidding data; (2) ﬁnd and examine more gen-
eral revenue-maximizing mechanisms for providing
intermediary supply-demand matching services; and
(3) allow for competition among multiple hetero-
geneous intermediaries using differentiated mecha-
nisms for allocating referrals (cf. Bhargava et al. 2007
for a ﬁrst step in this direction).
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Note ﬁrst that always 2u − 1u ≤

1
u , i.e., the expected gain in utility by one additional
search cannot exceed the expected utility from a single
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search. Using (2) the expected ex ante beneﬁt from search-
ing twice is
2u =
∫

maxu1	u2
gu1	u2 du1	u2
≤
∫

u1+u2gu1	u2 du1	u2= 21u 	
since ⊂2+ by assumption. Naturally, the partition of the
consumer base , outlined in Lemma 1, is free of overlaps,
so that 0 +1 +2 = 1. Let k be the set of consumers for
whom searching k times is individually rational (cf. Foot-
note 10). For k ≥ 1 searches it is k = 0	 F ku  ∩ , so
that 2 ⊂ 1 and 0 = \1. In other words, consumers
in 1 who search at least once might also search twice, and
those that do not search at all are in the complement of 1
with respect to . The marginal consumers are determined
by the distribution function F evaluated at the expected
beneﬁt kk of searching k times. It is ex ante incentive-
compatible for a consumer c ∈ 1 to perform k∗c = 2
instead of just one search if and only if 2u − 2c ≥ 1u − c,
or, equivalently, if and only if c ∈ 0	 F 2u −1u ∩ ⊂2.
This yields the proposed segmentation of the consumer
base  into search classes with 2 = 2, 1 = 1\2, and
0 = 1−1−2, which concludes our proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) For any given  ∈ 0	1
let % ∈ 0	" be an arbitrary constant. If ﬁrm L bids
b∗L = 1+%, then ﬁrm H ’s lowest winning bid is b∗H = b∗L−"=
1 + % − ". Its payoffs at that bid are ∗H = 1 − b∗Hh =
"−%≥ 0, where h≡ 1 is ﬁrm H ’s probability of winning
the auction. Hence, there is no reason for ﬁrm H to deviate
from this equilibrium strategy. Firm L also has no reason to
deviate, because its proﬁts cannot increase beyond zero by
increasing (or decreasing) its bid. (ii) If ﬁrm L expects a ran-
dom number of clicks, then in a pure-strategy equilibrium
ﬁrm L can never recoup its cost, implying nonparticipation
by the low-type ﬁrm. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Because  ∈ 0	 ¯, it is >". If
the ﬁrm of performance-type H randomizes over bids with
probability distribution PH and the ﬁrm of performance-
type L randomizes over bids with probability distribu-
tion QL, then the ﬁrms’ respective expected payoffs are
HPH	QL=
∫ −"
0
1−z1QLz+"+2dPHz (A1)
for ﬁrm H , and
LPH	QL=
∫ 
"
11− yPHy−"−2ydQLy (A2)
for ﬁrm L. Note that in equilibrium the support of ﬁrm H ’s
bids is contained in 0	 − " whereas the support of
ﬁrm L’s nonzero bids is contained in "	 (bidding less
than " results in a sure loss of the auction for ﬁrm L so that
bidding zero is better). Because by part (ii) of Proposition 1
a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist, we look for a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. Firm H is willing to randomize
on the support 0	−" if and only if the integrand in (A1)
is equal to a constant cH , i.e.,
1− z1QLz+"+2= cH (A3)
for all z ∈ 0	−". By setting z= −" we ﬁnd that cH =
1+21−+". Thus, by substituting y = z+" and the
expression for cH in (A3), ﬁrm L’s bid distribution can be
written in the form (16) for all y ∈ 0	. Similarly, setting
the integrand in (A2) equal to a constant cL, i.e.,
11− yPHy−"−2y = cL
for all y ∈ "	, we obtain cL = 11 −  − 2 (by
setting y = ), and thus (with z = y − ") relation (15).
By construction, the distributions PH and QL in (15)
and (16) constitute a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the bid-
ding game.
We now show that this mixed-strategy equilibrium is
unique. Suppose that there is another mixed-strategy equi-
librium with respective bid distributions QL for ﬁrm L,
and PH for ﬁrm H . By the same argument as above the
respective supports for these distributions must be con-
tained in 0	 and 0	 − " respectively. It is also clear
that QL is constant on the interval 0	" because such pos-
itive bids lead to a sure loss for ﬁrm L. Thus, the only way
the equilibrium described by QL	 PH can differ from the one
described by QL	PH is if the support of the new mixed-
strategy equilibrium differs by a set of nonzero measure. In
other words, there exists a bid amount so that a ﬁrm does
not submit any bid in the neighborhood of that bid amount.
But then the other ﬁrm can ensure winning the all-pay auc-
tion for sure by bidding that amount (plus or minus ") for
sure, resulting in a pure-strategy equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) We assume that both ﬁrms L
and H follow the mixed equilibrium strategies according
to q∗L· and p∗H· speciﬁed in (15)–(16). Then, based on (7)
and using (17), ﬁrm H expects to net the proﬁts
∗H =
∫
2+
Hy	zq
∗
Lyp
∗
Hzdy	 z
= 1
(
1−
1−"
(
"

)2
+ "

(
−"
1−" − b¯
∗
H
)
+B∗H
)
+21− b¯∗H	 (A4)
where using (15)
B∗H =
∫ −"
0+
1− zp∗Hz
[∫ z+"
"
q∗Lydy
]
dz
= 1− −"

b¯∗H  (A5)
By substituting the expressions (17) and (A5) into (A4), one
obtains that ∗H = 2 + 1 + 2". Let us now turn to the
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expected equilibrium proﬁts for ﬁrm L, which using (8) as
well as (18) can be written as
∗L =
∫
2+
Ly	zq
∗
Lyp
∗
Hzdy	 z
= 1
(
1−"
1−"
(
−"

− b¯∗L
)
+B∗L
)
−2b¯∗L	 (A6)
where with (16) and (18):
B∗L =
∫ 
"
q∗Ly1− y
[∫ y−"
0+
p∗Hzdz
]
dy
= 1−"
1−"
(
b¯∗L−
−"

)
+ 1−

b¯∗L (A7)
Substituting expressions (18) and (A7) into (A6) yields
that ∗L = 0. (ii) In period one, both ﬁrms expect the
same equilibrium proﬁts =∗F . With probability Prob"≥  a
zero-bid equilibrium occurs in which =∗F "≥ = 1+2/2.
In the event that this is not the case, both ﬁrms expect
to bid the positive amount b¯∗L + b¯∗H/2, so that with
probability Prob" <  we obtain using part (i) that
=
∗F "< = E ∗H "</2. This implies expression (19), which
completes our proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let u1	u2 ∈ , and uH , uL
be deﬁned by (5)–(6). We ﬁrst consider the case where
 ∈ 0	 ¯, where ¯ is implied by (14). Thus, there is a
nonzero-bid equilibrium with the ﬁrms’ choosing equilib-
rium bid distributions p∗H and q
∗
L according to (15)–(16).
Then the probability that the ﬁrm of performance-type H
wins the auction is given by
/u2−u1	 =
∫
0	2
1z≥y+u2−u1/1−
 p
∗
Hzq
∗
Lydy	 z
where p∗H and q
∗
L depend on = , which we have explic-
itly noted. The integration (which is similar to the one
carried out in the proof of Lemma 3) yields the explicit
expression for / in (22). The (maximum) value of a rank-
one referral  is in turn determined by Lemma 2 and
thus is a function of ˆ1u . The three equations in (22)
therefore determine the tuple 	 ˆ1u 	/ for any given
 ∈ 0	 ¯. We now consider the situation when  ∈ ¯	1
which implies a zero-bid equilibrium. In that case, ﬁrms
do not bid and—as a consequence of our tiebreaking rule
which weakly favors the high-performance type—no con-
sumers will search twice, so that ≡ 1 and correspond-
ingly ˆ1u ≡2u , which completes our argument. 
Proof of Lemma 4. In equilibrium all products will get
sold at a unit margin. Thus, W = 1 + 2 is the sum of
the welfare allocated to the search intermediary and both
ﬁrms L, H . Using Lemma 3 we have that =∗I = 1 + 2−
2=∗F , which using (12) implies (25). 
Proof of Proposition 4. By differentiating (26) with
respect to  we obtain:
6 ∗I
6
= ′1− 1+2′"¯− 1+2"¯′	 (A8)
with
′1= f ˆ1u + f 2u − ˆ1u 2u −1u h′ > 0	
(A9)
′2=−f 2u − ˆ1u 2u −1u h′ < 0	 (A10)
"¯′= ,¯u/1− 2 > 0
Substituting the last expressions into (A8) and rearranging
yields the equality in (27). If ∗ = 0 is a strict maximizer
of the intermediary’s expected equilibrium proﬁts, then the
slope of ∗I  must be negative in a right-neighborhood
of ∗ = 0, which implies the inequality in (27). This con-
cludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Differentiating the social wel-
fare W with respect to  yields
W ′ = ′1+′2+CS′
= f ˆ1u 2u −1u h′+CS′	 (A11)
where CS is given by (28),
CS= 1ˆ1u +22u −
∫ c1
0
cf c dc−
∫ c2
0
cf c dc
Using the deﬁnition of ck for k= 1	2 in Footnote 13 as well
as relation (4), we obtain
6
6
∫ c1
0
cf c dc= c1f c1c′1 = ˆ1u f c1f ˆ1u 2u −1u h′	
and
6
6
∫ c2
0
cf cdc = c2f c2c′2
= −2u −ˆ1u f 2u −ˆ1u 2u −1u h′
As a direct consequence we obtain
CS′= 12u − ˆ1u h′ > 0	
for all  ∈ . This proves part (i). Part (ii) then fol-
lows directly from (A11) after noting that 1 + 2′ =
f ˆ
1
u 
2
u −1u h′ > 0 for all  ∈, which completes
the proof. 
Appendix B. Some Empirical Observations
In this section we provide some empirical observations
on ﬁrms’ actual referral bidding behavior, which is far
from conclusive evidence. Nevertheless, we believe that
they can contribute some at least anecdotal justiﬁcation
for our results, which were derived from a one-shot bid-
ding model. In reality ﬁrms bid in multiple rounds, and
we do hope that further theoretical and empirical research
can shed more light on ﬁrms’ (behavioral) dynamic strate-
gies when bidding for paid referrals. Our bidding data
were obtained from Overture Services, a market leader in
the paid search market (taken over by Yahoo! in 2003 for
US$1.63B, and Yahoo! Search Marketing, as of May 2007).
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The data stem from the U.S. ﬂower market spanning about
18 months, from January 2001 to August 2002. They con-
tain four variables: ﬁrm ID, the search term on which bids
are placed, a time stamp for each bid, and the respective
bid amounts. In total, 384 ﬁrms bid 282,480 times across 12
search terms, with an average bid of $1.45 per referral (or
“click-through”). As a reference, we also report the num-
ber of searches (corresponding to 1 + 2 in our model)
incurred in the month of September 2002 with respect to
each search term. Bids for paid referrals in the U.S. ﬂower
market are substantial: the average bid is above $1 for eight
out of twelve search terms, and some ﬁrms are willing to
pay as high as $8.86 for each consumer referral by Overture,
whose ranking is entirely based on bid amount (correspond-
ing to  = 0 in our model). Search terms are auctioned off
in a continuous open-bid auction. The ﬁrm that bids the
most is displayed ﬁrst; in the case of tied bids the interme-
diary displays the corresponding ﬁrms randomly on their
achieved rank.25
To examine the ﬁrms’ bidding behavior, we focus our
analysis on the “ﬂower” search term and we restrict our
attention to those 33 ﬁrms that bid at least 100 times. Exam-
ining individual ﬁrms’ bidding histories shows that there is
high relative bid dispersion, which can be characterized by
the coefﬁcient of variation (corresponding to sample stan-
dard deviation divided by sample mean). The coefﬁcient of
variation measures the degree of deviation from the mean
as a percentage. The average of this coefﬁcient over 33 ﬁrms
is 35.5%, which implies that ﬁrms’ bids ﬂuctuate 35.5%
around the mean. We ﬁnd that relative bid dispersion is
high, as 27 out of 33 ﬁrms exhibit bids with a coefﬁcient of
variation above 30%.
We assume here that ﬁrm bidding occurs within “strate-
gic groups” (Caves and Porter 1977, McGee and Thomas
1986) of the ﬂower industry. For simplicity, and to be able
to relate our observations to the model, we restrict attention
in this paper to strategic groups consisting of two ﬁrms.
Using as a criterion for competitive bidding a “small” rel-
ative difference of not more than 20% in bid averages, we
identiﬁed six strategic groups among the 33 ﬁrms that bid
at least 100 times for the search term “ﬂower.” To maximize
the signal-to-noise ratio we concentrated on strategic groups
with frequent bidding activity and high average bids, which
led us to the strategic group consisting of Firms 352 and 356
for closer examination.26 From July 28, 2002 to August 31,
2002, Firm 352 bid 452 times with average amount $3.42,
and Firm 356 placed 477 bids averaging $3.02.
Figure B.1 plots the two ﬁrms’ bids over a time interval
from July 28 through August 31, 2002. In §3 we showed that
25 This tiebreaking rule is somewhat different from the one assumed
in our model (higher-performance ﬁrm ﬁrst), but this has no effect
on the model outcome for 7→ 0+.
26 We refer to the ﬁrms anonymously due to a nondisclosure agree-
ment with Overture.
Figure B.1 Firms 352 and 356’s Bidding Behavior (July 28–August 31,
2002)
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a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for  = 0,
as is the case for Overture. However, according to Propo-
sition 2 there is a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,
with bid densities speciﬁed by (15)–(16). Note that pH = qL,
if "= 0. The latter condition is satisﬁed, because Overture’s
engine design is such that = 0 (full ranking weight on bid).
We test the goodness-of-ﬁt of our derived mixed strategy
with respect to the bidding data collected for Firms 352 and
356. For this purpose we use the quantile-quantile (Q-Q)
plot technique (Chambers et al. 1983, Johnson and Wichern
1998), a graphical technique for determining if two data
sets come from populations with a common distribution.
For identical distributions (up to scaling and translation) the
Q-Q plot naturally degenerates to a straight line. Using lin-
ear regression it is then possible to test the goodness-of-ﬁt
between each ﬁrm’s sample bid distribution and the theo-
retical distribution. Our hypotheses are therefore
H352/H356 Firm’s 352/356 bidding data is consistent
with (15)–(16) and = 0
We ﬁrst generated 1,000 bids according to the theoret-
ical equilibrium densities in Proposition 2. Overture, for
example, originally based its rankings purely on the bid
amount, so that  is zero in this case (so that " = 0 as a
consequence). The precise value of  ∈ 0	1 is immaterial
to the Q-Q analysis. Using this simulated data, we then
plotted two Q-Q charts as shown in Figure B.2, with the
theoretical data at the x-coordinate and the observed data
at the y-coordinate. The distance of the curve to the refer-
ence line (the straight line in the plots) reﬂects the closeness
of the theoretical distribution to the empirical distribution.
The straight line in the Q-Q plot connects the ﬁrst and the
third quartile to provide—as commonly practiced—some
visual indication of ﬁt. A correlation-coefﬁcient test is often
used to measure the straightness of the Q-Q plot (Johnson
and Wichern 1998, p. 193) and thus the ﬁt between the
two sample distributions. Computing the correlation coefﬁ-
cients based on 50 data points sampled from the Q-Q plot,
Weber and Zheng: A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals
434 Information Systems Research 18(4), pp. 414–436, © 2007 INFORMS
Figure B.2 Q-Q Plots Comparing Firms 352 and 356’s Bidding Behavior to the Theoretical Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Distribution
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we obtain 0.972 and 0.982 for Firms 352 and 356 respec-
tively. Since the ﬁrms’ bids are not independent, we need to
test the two hypotheses H352 and H356 simultaneously. For
this we use the standard Bonferroni correction for multi-
ple comparisons. The corrected critical values (using a one-
way test) are R∗50	005 = 0977 at the 0.05-signiﬁcance level
and R∗50	010 = 0967 at the 0.10-signiﬁcance level. This indi-
cates that at the 0.05-level, there is no signiﬁcant difference
between the distributions governing the simulated data and
Firm 356’s bidding data. Similarly, there is no signiﬁcant
difference between the simulated data and Firm 352’s bid-
ding data at a 0.10-level. Thus, neither H352 nor H356 can be
rejected by our sample data.
The observed bidding data of Firms 352 and 356 indicate
that their intertemporal bidding behavior is distribution-
ally consistent with our theoretical mixed-strategy equilib-
rium speciﬁed in Proposition 2. However, as can easily be
seen by inspecting the ﬁrms’ time-series bidding behavior
as well as Figure B.1, those intertemporal bidding strate-
gies are correlated (the corresponding cross-correlation coef-
ﬁcient is 0.65), which is not consistent with the theoretical
one-shot mixed-strategy equilibrium (cf. Footnote 21). This
suggests that those ﬁrms that engage in intertemporal cor-
related bidding are not myopic when determining their bid
amounts. A high bid is more likely to be trumped by an
even higher bid. The ﬁrms thus seem to iterate through their
best-response correspondences yielding a noticeably cycli-
cal behavior.
Appendix C. General Ranking Functions
We now discuss the generality of the intermediary’s search
engine design based on the ranking function r in (3), in
which the relative weight placed on consumer surplus ver-
sus bids is a convex combination determined by the design
parameter  ∈ 0	1. For this, let us consider an alternative,
more general, smooth ranking function :b	u; which
depends on a design parameter ; ∈ 0	1. In order not to
induce perverse bidding behavior, it is clear that for each
feasible value of ; the ranking function : needs to be
increasing in both b and u. As a result, given the surplus
realizations uH and uL and ﬁrm j’s bid bj with j ∈ L	H

ﬁrm i 
= j (with i ∈ L	H
) needs to bid such that
:bi	ui;≥ :bj	uj; (C.1)
in order to win the auction (with the inequality being
strict in case i = L). Using the implicit function theorem
(Rudin 1976, pp. 224–225), there is a smooth function
<ui	:bj	uj;; such that the inequality (C.1) can be
rewritten in the form
bi ≥ <ui	:bj	uj;; (C.2)
for any ; ∈ 0	1. To address the question about the relative
importance of bids versus surplus in the ranking of ﬁrms
we assume that the intermediary’s mechanism parametriza-
tion is chosen such that the ratio
=b	u;≡
(
6:b	u;
6b
)−1(6:b	u;
6u
)
(C.3)
is increasing in ; for any ﬁxed b	u and =·	 ·0= 0,
=·	 ·1 = . The last two relations express the natural
boundary conditions for the search engine designer which
are such that for ; = 0 the ranking function does not
depend on the ﬁrms’ product performance while for ; = 1
the ranking function does not depend on the ﬁrms’ bids.
This in turn implies the ﬁrms’ expected payoffs as a func-
tion of their bids,
HbL	 bH;
=


1+21− bH	 if bH ≥ <uH	:bL	uH;;	
21− bH	 if bH < <uH	:bL	uH;;	
(C.4)
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and
LbL	bH;
=


−2bL	 if bL><uL	:bH	uH;;	
−2bL+11−bL	 if bL≤<uL	:bH	uH;;	
(C.5)
as well as their response correspondences,
b∗HbL; = argmax
bH≥0
HbL	 bH;
=


bL−"H+	 if bL ≤ +"H	
0	 if bL > +"H	
(C.6)
and
b∗LbH; = argmax
bL≥0
LbL	 bH;
=


bH +"L+ #	 if bH < −"L− #	
0	 if bH ≥ −"L− #	
(C.7)
where for any  ∈ 0	1 the function "i = "iui	uj	;	 is
implicitly deﬁned by
<uj	:"j +	ui;;=  (C.8)
Note that in the case where ; =  and : = r as in (3) we
obtain that "H ="L =" as in (13). Thus, the analysis in the
main portion of the paper remains essentially unchanged
except for the fact that the bid difference "i required for
winning (as a result of the intermediary’s consideration of
surplus when determining the winning bidder) as perceived
by ﬁrm i ∈ L	H
 becomes ﬁrm-speciﬁc. We now show
that "i is nonnegative, which implies that all the results
in the main paper remain qualitatively unchanged. Indeed,
for ; = 0 relation (C.8), combined with the deﬁnition of <
as the inverse of the ranking function : with respect to bids,
becomes
:	ui0= :"i +	uj0	
so that necessarily "i = 0 (given that, by virtue of =·	 ·0
= 0, the ranking function : is independent of a ﬁrm’s prod-
uct performance and, by assumption, increasing in its bid).
From (C.1) and (C.2) we obtain that < is—all else equal—
decreasing in ; , for (given any nonzero product perfor-
mance) as the relative weight of bids decreases the bid
necessary to attain a given ﬁxed ranking-function value
decreases. Using the assumed monotonicity of : we there-
fore ﬁnd, by differentiating (C.8) with respect to ; , that
6"i
6;
=−
(
6<
6:
6:
6b
)−1( 6<
6;
)
−
(
6:
6b
)−1( 6:
6;
)
≥ 0	
which thus together with "i;=0 = 0 implies that "i is non-
negative for any ; ∈ 0	1.
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